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ATLANTA, GA - On paper, the 2024 General Election in Grady County, Georgia, looks like any other local contest. But inside the machine logs—the SLOG files from precinct tabulators—there’s a different story. A close read of those logs reveals error patterns that raise urgent questions about federal compliance, constitutional requirements, and basic public confidence in how votes are recorded and reported.

This post walks through the findings of the “2024 Grady County Georgia General Election — SLOG Error Analysis Report,” and then situates those findings alongside comments delivered to the Georgia House Blue Ribbon Study Committee on Election Procedures on October 16, 2025.
A “ballot position” is a single choice on a ballot—like a candidate selection or a yes/no on a referendum.
The report identifies 6,317 machine-logged errors across four categories, affecting 58.66% of all ballots. When measured against the federal target error rate of 1 error per 10,000,000 ballot positions, the observed rate is 1 error per 58 positions—about 0.0173%.1 That’s approximately 172,543 times higher than the Election Assistance Commission’s (EAC) target referenced in federal law at 52 U.S.C. § 21081 (often cited as “1 in 10,000,000” under the Help America Vote Act’s performance metrics).
Primary error types found:
While that last category is the smallest by count, it has outsized significance because of how similar QR code-related defects have played out in real elections.
The report flags 284 “QR code Signature mismatch” errors across the 10,768 ballots (roughly 366,112 ballot positions). Errors of this class have a documented history in other jurisdictions. According to the report, this same defect was identified in Tennessee, acknowledged by Dominion and the EAC, and led the Tennessee Secretary of State to recommend discontinuing use of the affected system. The EAC’s official “Report of Investigation: Dominion D‑Suite 5.5‑B” explains how QR misreads on ImageCast Precinct (ICP) tabulators could mark ballots as provisional and fail to reset, causing downstream reporting mismatches. The EAC and Dominion validated the problem and approved engineering changes in March 2022 to address it.
In Grady County’s dataset, the QR code error is heavily concentrated: 221 of the 284 instances (77.8%) occur in a single file (AV1.pdf), with the remaining 63 spread across eight others. Two files (Pine Park.pdf, Spence.pdf) show zero instances of this specific error.
Why this matters: even when a central count or canvass ultimately reconciles the totals, precinct-level poll reports can misstate scanned ballot counts on the devices affected during Election Day—undermining transparency at the point where voters and poll workers expect accurate end-of-day reporting.
The presentation’s conclusions explicitly connect these findings to:
It’s worth noting the presentation asserts “No change since deployed in 2020, even after known issues reported,” which, if accurate, raises oversight and certification questions—especially in light of the EAC’s earlier acknowledgment of QR-code defects and Tennessee’s response.
At the October 16, 2025 hearing, commenters echoed and amplified the report’s implications, stating:
These statements mirror the presentation’s “Considerations for Further Review” and its concluding recommendations: pause use of the system in federal elections, investigate the broader statewide impact in 2024–2025, and require recertification to federal standards before redeployment.
Precision and transparency are the currency of election legitimacy. Even when back-end redundancy (like central count systems or hand tallies) recovers the correct totals, visible discrepancies at the precinct level introduce confusion and doubt for poll workers, watchers, candidates, and voters. When those discrepancies scale beyond federal performance targets, the public reasonably asks whether the system, as configured and certified, is meeting its obligations.
The Grady County analysis doesn’t claim that outcomes were flipped. Instead, it documents a high incidence of machine-logged errors relative to federal targets, a known and previously investigated QR-code defect class, and evidence that precinct-level reporting can go awry when specific tabulators encounter those conditions. Combined, these findings justify the requests for investigation, immediate risk-limiting policy responses, and a rigorous recertification path.
The central promise of elections is not just that the math adds up at the end—it’s that every step along the way is auditable, understandable, and compliant with law. Grady County’s logs are a timely reminder that the details inside our systems matter, and that restoring trust requires not only correct results, but also systems that demonstrably meet the standards the law—and the people—demand.
Field Searcy is co-founder of GeorgiansForTruth.org, a grassroots volunteer effort to bring election integrity to Georgia. Visit for more information and supporting documentation.
1 Election Assistance Commission. (2002). Voting system standards: Volume I: Performance standards (Section 3.2.1: Accuracy requirements, pp. 3-51–3-52). U.S. Federal Election Commission.https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/Voting_System_Standards_Volume_I.pdf
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